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MILITARY RESPONSES TO CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE1
In a world not too different from this one Civilitas and 
Militaria are two countries that constitute respectively the western 
and eastern half of a large island Militaria is more densely 
populated than Civilitas but contains less natural resources than the 
other island-nation As its name suggests Militaria also boasts an 
impressive army and recently it has threatened to use that army 
against its largely unarmed neighbor Militaria demands a fair share 
of the island's natural resources and m  order to accommodate its 
large population wants to move the border between the two countries 
westward Because Civilitas has steadfastly refused to comply with 
Militaria's demands the latter is preparing itself to invade 
Civilitas and take by force what it could not obtain through 
diplomacy
Common sense predicts that if Militaria attacks Civilitas the 
latter can do little else than capitulate and passively accept its 
fate However there exists an alternative view of the situation That 
view suggests that Civilitas rely on nonviolent struggle to withstand 
and ultimately to defeat its opponent According to that view an 
aggressor cannot fulfill its objectives as long as its occupation 
forces have to cope with continuous and massively supported acts of 
noncooperation and defiance If Civilitas were to counter Militaria's 
aggression with nonviolent obstruction defiance, sabotage and 
noncooperation it could keep the occupier from reaching its 
objectives and in the end force it to withdraw its troops
2Militaria may try to brutally suppress the resistance but the 
excessive use of violence will be taxing on the morale of the 
occupation troops and will tend to erode the political support for the 
invasion within Militaria Faced with the prospect that the costs of 
the invasion may be much greater than its benefits, Militaria refrain 
from invading and occupying Civilitas In this way a nonviolent 
defense policy may enable Civilitas not only to prevail against an 
invader but also to deter potential aggressors such as Militaria 
from ever carrying out their invasion plans
In a nutshell this is how advocates of civilian-based defense 
(also known as social defense nonviolent defense or nonmilitary 
defense) would suggest that Civilitas counters Militaria's threat 
Civilian-based defense has nowhere yet been introduced as a substitute 
for military defense But some European countries notably Sweden and 
Austria have implemented some form of civilian-based defense as a 
supplement to their military defense system  ^ In addition according 
to one count close to two hundred methods of nonviolent struggle are 
known to have been successfully applied m  practice by a wide array of 
social movements 3 Nearly all of them could be integrated m  a 
structured national defense and further perfected through advance 
training and organization Historical evidence shows that even 
improvised nonviolent resistance has been somewhat effective against 
military aggression Hence if tactics of nonviolent resistance were 
channeled into a well-organized national defense strategy there can 
be no doubt that their power to deflect military force would be 
greatly enhanced
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Suppose that by adopting a civilian-based defense Civilitas 
would, indeed be able to deter Militaria from overrunning its 
territory and appropriating by force what it cannot secure by more 
peaceful means From a traditional military perspective possessing 
such a deterrent capability suffices as a bulwark against military 
aggression as such The presumption is that if a defense system can 
thwart plans for a massive invasion it can stave off lesser military 
threats as well Advocates of civilian-based defense have tended to go 
along with this reasoning They have concentrated on showing that 
nonviolent resistance would render a military invasion so unprofitable 
for the aggressor that invasion plans against nations that rely on 
civilian-based defense are unlikely to be carried out However they 
have overlooked the possibility that small scale attacks instead of 
massive invasions may be the real military threat to a civilian- 
based defense system The potential impact of small-scale military 
operations on a civilian-based defense system has remained undiscussed 
so far s There is thus a serious gap m  the research on the 
viability of civilian-based defense The purpose of this article is to 
help fill this gap
In order to set up a framework for the investigation I will 
show first how civilian-based defense forces a redefinition of the 
costs and benefits of warfare Applied to the case of a full-scale 
military invasion of a country that relies on nonviolent defense this 
framework predicts that the aggressor will amass many more costs than 
benefits “ The picture becomes much more complex however when it 
comes to calculating the costs and benefits for the two sides m  lower
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level conflicts In such conflicts the effectiveness of civilian- 
based defense is considerably hampered by its nonterritonal nature 
Äs a result I will argue, the resiliency of civilian-based defense 
depends to a considerable degree on the kind of society it is meant to 
protect
The Strategy of Civilian-based Defense
In order to prevent an enemy from invading one's country the 
enemy has to be deterred from doing so the enemy has to become 
convinced that the costs of an invasion would be much higher than its 
benefits A prerequisite for obtaining that result is nearly always 
that one is actually capable of denying an invading army the benefits 
it seeks and of burdening it with the costs it wants to avoid From a 
military perspective, costs refer mainly to deaths injuries and 
destruction and benefits to control over territory its people and 
its resources Hence to defeat an invader militarily one has 
simultaneously to "out-mjure" him and prevent him from making 
territorial gains ' But this can only be done by opposing the 
aggressor's military might with military forces of one's own that is 
by risking to incur the same kind and amount of costs that one wants 
to burden the enemy with Thus resisting an invasion militarily 
implies a high toll of casualties and destruction on one’s own side as 
much as on the enemy's side
The core idea of civilian-based defense is that military 
invasions can be deterred and resisted without paying that toll 
Instead of resisting an invasion militarily civilian-based defense
5
proposes to resist it through nonviolent struggle s By reacting to the 
violent penetration of one's national territory with the nonviolent 
protection of one's institutions and ways of life the costs and 
benefits involved in warfare are redefined Territorial gams are no 
longer benefits to the enemy for they do not result in control over 
its people and its resources That control is withheld from the enemy 
through active and sustained political and economic noncooperation 
( e g ,  strikes slow-downs, and refusals to carry orders) Rather than 
protecting economic and political institutions with a hard shell of 
military violence civilian-based defense turns the popular power that 
is inherent m  these institutions as a weapon against the enemy 
Thus not only do the benefits of territorial control become void 
they turn into costs for the enemy by providing the context m  which 
civilian-based defense is activated
The costs consist only partly m  the enemy's frustrations at 
being unable to obtain the benefits it is after Yet they indicate the 
general nature of these costs psychological instead of physical 
damage The role of psychological factors for determining the outcome 
of international conflicts should not be underestimated Nations are 
primarily psychological phenomena they exist because people identify 
with groups on the basis of common characteristics Perhaps the most 
concise and encompassing way of defining a nation is as "a body of 
people who feel that they are a nation MC? Through identification 
national characteristics help to define a person's self-concept 
Persons thus become part of a nation by making the nation part of 
themselves This explains why most people find it unproblematic to
6talk about nations as if they were persons Pride and honor a sense 
of accomplishment achievement and efficacy and feelings of revenge 
and resentment are as easily attributed to nations as to human 
individuals Even if nations are fictitious entities and their 
attributes empirically nonsense they form the social-psychological 
basis of all national enterprises including war
The military perspective takes the personification of nations for 
granted Not groups of individuals go to war but nations that are 
presumed to be monolithic entities The strength and originality of 
civilian-based defense is that it tries to attain victory by 
disintegrating this assumed substratum of international warfare Since 
it cannot destroy the physical power wielded by ar enemy it attacks 
the basis of that power the feelings of national unity and pride the 
expectations of national glory and honor and the emotions and 
loyalties that sustain the war effort Its strategy is to erode the 
enemy's self-esteem that is to take away the reasons why people take 
pride m  their nation and by doing so to remove the reasons people 
have to identify with their nation If people no longer identify with 
their nation national loyalty and patriotism evaporate and without 
them national enterprises fall apart Instead other loyalties and 
group identifications based on religion social class ethnic 
background party affiliation or even family membership will 
substitute for the loss m  sense of national unity
Probably the most significant way m  which civilian-based 
defense erodes the self-esteem of its adversaries is by targeting 
their sense of moral worth or integrity It can do so because even
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armies are bound to some extent by the moral rules that govern their 
society and will be restrained by them in using violence against a 
civilian population While it is true that moral rules against cruelty 
and murder are m  war circumstances easily trespassed, the trespassing 
is always accompanied by a legitimation The cruelties and murders are 
by their perpetrators not recognized for what they are but presented 
as acts of justice or rightful punishment ir Hence the contradiction 
between the reality of war and rules of morality does not result m  an 
outright denial of the validity of morality it yields a denial of the 
reality of war by discursively transforming it into a fiction that 
affirms the validity of morality At the same time, however the 
social credibility of fictions is limited and determined by the extent 
to which acts of war clash with moral rules For instance if both 
parties in a conflict use violence it is relatively easy and credible 
for them to justify their behavior as self-defense But if only one 
side uses violent means, it can hardly claim to act m  self-defense 
when it tries to repress a nonviolent resistance
Because most societies regard the intentional use of violence 
against an unarmed opponent as immoral an invader is forced to 
violate morality m  order to oppress nonviolent resistance The 
invader will undoubtedly try to legitimize such violations by blaming 
the enemy but it is hardly plausible to present nonviolent resisters 
as aggressors or as being m  any other way responsible for the 
suffering caused to them Consequently the violence that the 
occupation soldiers inflict will tax their moral conscience and 
negatively affect their morale Furthermore international opinion
8will probably become vehemently opposed to the invasion and this may 
find an outlet m  diplomatic and economic sanctions against the 
invader’s country And finally there is the effect of the violence 
on the political support at the home front The violence used by the 
occupation troops the declining morale among them and the storm of 
international disapproval the violence will produce are all factors 
that will conspire in disintegrating the patriotic fervor m  the home 
country Vietnam and Afghanistan have proved that even wars m  which 
both sides use violence can become rapidly unpopular among the 
occupier's home population How much more swiftly then will 
occupiers lose their home support if the enemy they fight is not a 
treacherous guerilla force but an unarmed civilian population
A Military Counter-strategy for Civilian-based Defense
The argumentation so far suggests that civilian-based defense may 
be able to resist a full-scale invasion On the assumption that 
potential aggressors are convinced by that reasoning they will have 
to follow alternative courses of action to reach their goals Armies 
will have to develop strategies that are less costly and more 
effective than a full-scale invasion In that case the real test for 
civilian-based defense is not whether it can resist full-scale 
invasions but whether it can resist strategies that are specifically 
designed to counter civilian-based defense Therefore a closer look 
must be taken at the weak spots of civilian-based defense and how 
these could be exploited by certain military strategies
The effectiveness of civilian-based defense depends on a strong
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sense of national unity Without pervasive feelings of national 
belonging civilian-based defense lacks the social cohesion and 
discipline that is required for an adequate nonviolent resistance 
However, unlike military defense systems, civilian-based defense is 
unable to protect an important aspect of that unity namely the 
national territory In fact, civilian-based defense can only be fully 
activated by letting the national territory be overrun by enemy 
forces As a result it cannot defend the traditional national 
security interest of preserving the integrity of the national 
territory This may explain why the few countries that have showed 
some interest m  civilian-based defense are countries that can have 
little hope of stopping a military invasion at their borders It also 
provides an additional explanation for why a civilian-based defense 
system can successfully resist an occupation For paradoxically only 
under occupation circumstances does the goal of defeating the enemy 
neatly coincide with the goal of expelling the enemy from the national 
territory Only then can a civilian-based defense system attach value 
to the integrity of the national territory
Military operations that violate the integrity of an opponent's 
territory without occupying it considerably reduce the amount of 
contact between the armed forces and the population As a result 
hostile border penetrations can largely avoid the costs that 
nonviolent resistance inflicts on occupation forces More 
specifically they can neutralize the resistance by meeting three 
conditions The first one is that the interventions are at least 
initially not direct means for fulfilling the ultimate objectives
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that instigated them Their use has to be restricted to pursuing goals 
the fulfillment of which requires no significant compliance from the 
opponent's population In this way the noncooperation and defiance 
strategies of the resistance remain useless The second condition is 
that the violence that is inherent to military weaponry must be 
directed against carefully selected targets and should not be 
displayed in a massive or random way Military means have to serve 
primarily as vehicles for psychological warfare, not as tools for 
physical destruction The final condition is that the violence must be 
used m  a way that is least in contradiction with generally accepted 
moral standards More specifically the targets have to be material 
objects rather than persons and, if persons they have to be official 
and political figures rather than ordinary citizens In this way the 
attacker can safeguard its sense of moral integrity
These three conditions seriously restrict the nature of hostile 
border penetrations Yet they still allow the execution of a broad 
gamut of commando attacks These include cutting of the water 
electricity, gas and oil supply lines, sabotaging transportation and 
communication systems interrupting and destabilizing industrial and 
agricultural production processes, and destroying and stealing private 
and public property 11 A country that possesses a military defense 
system can prevent such attacks by sealing off its national borders 
with troops and armor Theoretically, civilian-based defense systems 
could use nonviolent barriers to serve the same end For instance 
people that are trained m  nonviolent obstruction could be stationed 
m  the country's outlying areas to function as living walls against
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intruders A network of material defense structures consisting of 
canals and concrete and steel obstacles could complement the human 
barriers However, it is doubtful whether the costs of such a system 
are m  proportion with the ease with which they can be circumvented 
For access to the country through the air cannot be prevented with 
nonviolent means and probably not much violence will be needed to 
break through the land barriers At any rate, since the most cost- 
effective way of damaging the territorial integrity of a nation that 
rests its defense on nonviolence is not through a massive invasion 
but through the repeated penetration of its boundaries commando units 
rather than tank divisions will carry out the attacks And obviously 
the former can penetrate boundaries m  a much smoother way than the 
latter
The immediate effect of repeated border penetrations is to 
foster a sense of vulnerability and powerlessness For even if the 
penetrations do not cause much perceptible damage they destroy a 
nation's most tangible symbol of unity and identity, its territorial 
integrity This psychological damage could be repaired to some extent 
by retaliating with economic and diplomatic sanctions If such 
sanctions are severe enough and exercised by the international 
community at large they may be sufficient to deter further actions 
However there is little reason to assume that the international 
community would actively support tough sanctions Sanctioning involves 
severing economic and political ties that as a whole have proved to be 
beneficial to all the countries involved In view of the limited 
nature of the boundary violations breaking these ties may be
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considered a too heavy sacrifice The country that relies on civilian- 
based defense is confronted with a humiliating show of force not with 
bloodshed Other nations may therefore, suffice to condemn the 
aggressor as a violator of international law Moreover these other 
nations will also be tempted to blame the victim They may reason 
correctly, that if only the attacked country would put up a military 
defense -- like all other countries let us suppose -- it would not 
have become subject to border violations In short sympathy for the 
country under attack will be much smaller than when it would be 
overrun by a war machine m  full gear Correspondingly the country 
will have a much harder time mustering the international support that 
would be needed to have the hostile interventions cease
Left without significant international support vulnerable to 
repeated surprise raids by enemy forces a nation that rests its hope 
on civilian-based defense is likely to experience a lowering of its 
morale A lowered morale will at its turn easily provoke 
disagreements about how to tackle the enemy threat The civilian-based 
defense consensus may come under fire from proponents of military 
action or adherents of appeasement Such disunity could easily be 
exploited by the enemy, not only by persisting m  its war of 
attrition but also by ordering agents provocateurs to stir up 
dissent
To some extent order could be preserved and enemy actions 
neutralized through police involvement But here lurks another danger 
for a society that relies on civilian-based defense The enemy may 
specifically try to provoke police violence so as to have a legitimate
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basis for escalating its own violence A society that wants to hold on 
to civilian-based defense will, therefore have to impose stringent 
limits on the police violence it will allow Not doing so would blur 
the boundaries between when to use violence and when to use 
nonviolence and this vagueness would very readily be exploited by an 
enemy
The Territorial Imperative
The immediate purpose of the hostile border penetrations is to 
weaken the national unity of the attacked country This purpose is 
attained by revealing the inability of civilian-based defense to 
protect the country against violations of its territory Defenders of 
civilian-based defense are likely to object that this way of 
formulating the border penetration problem overestimates the 
psychological significance of the national territory National unity 
and identity they would argue result primarily from belonging to the 
same political, social, and cultural institutions and not from living 
within the same geographical area The significance that is currently 
attached to territorial integrity is viewed by them as a product of 
the predominance of military ways of thinking As Boserup and Mack 
have put it "It is no doubt precisely the military importance of 
even territorial outposts which has made the national
territory' its sancticity and integrity such important national 
symbols "1
If Boserup and Mack are right m  a society that relies on 
civilian-based defense the national territory will largely lose its
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importance as a symbol of unity However, there are three reasons that 
cast serious doubt on the reliability of that prediction The first 
one is that social groups including nations come into existence when 
people define themselves m  contradistinction to other groups The 
process of group formation is always a process of differentiating 
between groups The extent to which a group manifests a separate 
identity will consequently depend on the clarity of the boundaries 
between itself and other groups The importance boundaries have for 
preserving and reinforcing a group’s identity will increase with the 
ease with which they can be recognized as setting one group apart from 
another Territorial boundaries have a recognition potential that is 
probably higher than that of any other kind of boundaries That is 
because as Sack has observed, territoriality makes classification by 
type subservient to classification by area
When we say that anything m  this area or room is ours or 
is off limits to you we are classifying or assigning things 
to a category such as 'ours* or ’not yours' according to its 
location m  space We need not stipulate the kinds of things 
m  place that are ours or not yours Thus territoriality 
avoids, to varying degrees the need for enumeration and 
classification by kind and may be the only means of 
asserting control if we cannot enumerate all of the 
significant factors and relationships to which we have 
access 13
A territory like a flag provides a unique and concrete signifier for 
a nation whereas cultural political and social characteristics of a
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nation are a cluster of not always clearly delineated and often 
abstract signifiers For that reason it is unlikely that such 
characteristics will be able to provide as strong a sense of identity 
and unity to a nation as its territorium does
The second reason why the national territory is likely to 
continue playing a significant psychological role is because people 
attach themselves emotionally to their physical environment The 
visible landscape in which they grow up and reside provides a 
background for the things they value m  life and by association 
comes to be valued itself Among the ancient Greeks and Romans Tuan 
has observed attachment to the homeland ran deeper than any other 
bond "Attachment to one's native land, the place of one's birth the 
hearth m  which one was nurtured was so strong that the
ancients could scarcely conceive a fate worse than exile unless it be 
the destruction of the country itself It is true that modern
means of transportation and communication have dramatically diminished 
people's dependency on the Heimat, but most people still reside most 
of their lives in the same region Even though technological progress 
has made it possible to quickly move from place to place 
territorially based economic and political ties have hardly become 
unraveled As a result people's psychological attachment to their 
habitat has anything but become obsolete 1=5
The homeland and the country are not identical but the fact 
that people's homelands are usually integral parts of their countries 
makes that they will want to defend the national boundaries m  order 
to prevent hostile intrusions of their homelands Hence the patriotic
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glorification of the national soil can be considered as a logical 
extension of more local Heimat-sentiments 1<ü It is true that the 
attachment to one's physical surroundings is the indirect product of 
valuing the cultural and social events that take place m  these 
surroundings But it does not follow that we should try to protect 
these events rather than their surroundings For events evolve and 
change over time vary m  their nature function and degree of 
organization All this makes them elusive and difficult to protect -- 
the very effort to protect them might even change their nature The 
physical surroundings of the events, on the other hand can be trusted 
to provide a relatively constant background to them the landscape 
provides a measure of stability that is greater than that of the flux 
of social and cultural life Hence protecting the land is both a more 
simple and more secure way of protecting a people's way of life
The willingness of people to defend the national boundaries is 
finally also due to people’s attachment to their property As with 
the homeland there is a transitive relationship between protecting 
one's property and defending one's country One’s property is part of 
one's country and since vigilantism is not accepted m  most modern 
societies the defense of one's property presupposes the defense of 
one s country Moreover threats to one's personal property do usually 
not come from abroad but from within one's country The country's 
legal system enforced primarily by the police helps to avert these 
threats but this means that ultimately the protection of one's 
property rests on the use or threat of violence If mtranational 
threats to one's property can be warded off through violence, why can
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extranational threats to it not be averted with the same means9 Is 
furthermore public property not the governmental equivalent of 
private property, and should it not be rightfully expected then that 
public property gets protected as if it were private property9 These 
questions strongly suggest that there is a dissonance between allowing 
private property boundaries to be enforced through the use of 
violence but not allowing public property boundaries to be enforced 
m  that way To be sure the dissonance does not amount to a logical 
inconsistency, but it may enhance feelings of insecurity among people 
whose defense relies on civilian-based defense People tend to reason 
by analogy as a result civilian-based defense will make them feel 
about as safe as when the defense of their personal property would 
depend on nonviolent resistance Barring major changes m  our society 
this is far more unlikely to happen than the introduction of a 
civilian-based defense system Hence defending the national 
territory is likely to be considered important as long as the 
protection of private property through a legal-cum-police system 
remains the rule
The role of the territorial factor m  achieving national unity 
suggests that border penetrations per se can corrode a country’s 
social cohesion Military interventions can further aggravate the 
corrosion effect through their choice of targets and tactics The 
weakening of patriotic loyalties is reflected m  the growing 
prominence of other loyalties Long-standing social rifts become more 
visible and threatening to the social stability of the society Ägent- 
provocateurs I suggested could fan such internal conflicts More
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importantly the border penetrations could deepen social divisions by 
targeting only certain groups within the country If for instance 
ethnic minorities show reluctance to bear the cost of defending the
ägäinst the hostilities, their restiveness could be encouraged 
by exempting them from attacks The effectiveness of such tactics 
would be considerably augmented if the groups that are singled out for 
preferential treatment live m  a separate geographical region rather 
than interspersed among the rest of the population This would 
facilitate a discriminatory targeting policy as well as heighten the 
minorities sense of territorial apartheid An added advantage of 
discriminatory targeting is finally that it provides an ideological 
cover-up for the military operations By aiming their assaults at the 
dominant powers within a society and by supporting minority groups 
the intervention troops can try to acquire a Robin Hood aura In the 
end minority groups within the assaulted society may even come to 
consider the aggressor as a liberator rather than as an enemy
Winning the War
The most effective military strategy against civilian-based 
defense turns out to be a strategy with a primarily psychological 
impact The violence used by the aggressor is mainly symbolic it is a 
vehicle for disintegrating the other country’s national unity This 
has two important implications The first one that will be returned 
to m  a moment, is that the strategy can by itself not fulfill the 
aggressor's objectives The second one is that the nonviolently 
defended society could try to use very similar means to try to
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destabilize its military opponent It also could attempt border 
crossings Depending on the length and nature of the border 
penetrations by nonviolent protest groups will be either impossible to 
prevent or only be possible to prevent at the price of an expensive 
border control network Furthermore agents provocateurs could try to 
infiltrate the other society m  order to fan nonviolent struggle 
against the regime Widespread information campaigns could be set up 
to discredit the regime m  the eyes of its own population Whether 
such methods would work better against this society than against the 
nonviolently defended society will depend on the social and 
political structures m  the two societies If the nonviolently 
defended society is thoroughly democratic, egalitarian and sensitive 
to the needs of its ethnic, religious and other minorities the
aggressor will have a hard time fostering national discord 
If simultaneously the stability m  the aggressor's society depends 
on an elitist and oppressive regime paralyzing dissension will be 
much easier to provoke m  this than m  the other society In short 
the fact that one country can use military force as a means to inflict 
psychological damage to another country does not imply that this 
country is invulnerable to counter-strategies by the nonviolently 
country it is attacking
Psychological warfare dominates only the first stage of the 
conflict In the second stage the aggressor will try to reach the 
objectives for which it instigated the hostilities One can 
distinguish between political objectives economic objectives and 
territorial objectives
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P0llt:LCal objectives are geared towards assuming control over the 
other country's state bureaucracy Because a state can only exist by 
the consent of the population it governs an aggressor will only be 
able to take over its opponent’s state apparatus if it managed to 
destroy the population's clout to resist Thus only if the first 
stage of the conflict has been very succesful can an aggressor hope to, 
extend its political power over the other society
Territorial objectives are aimed at possessing certain parts of 
the other country's territory for either military purposes (e g 
building a marine base m  case the attacker did not previously have an 
outlet to the open sea) or demographic purposes (e g the Nazi's 
Lebensraum policy)
The objectives are predominantly economic when the hostilities 
are directed towards achieving control over an area with special 
economic significance (e g the presence of oil-fields) meant to make 
an end to harmful economic competition (e g by destroying certain 
means of production) or simply aimed at enriching one's own society 
through piracy
Even if the aggressor gained a psychological edge over its 
opponent through its commando attacks reaching the ultimate 
objectives is not unproblematic The psychological damage to the 
attacked society may get repaired as it regains a focus to organize 
its nonviolent resistance around Suppose for instance that the 
aggressor wants to build a naval base on the other country's 
territory The execution of that wish provides the attacked society 
with at least two complementary nonviolent resistance strategies
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blocking the roads that lead to the port and blocking the port at sea 
(e g with f ishmg-boats ) If no violence is used against them the 
blockades could virtually prevent the construction and operation of 
the base On the other hand, using violence to remove the blockades 
may produce costs to the morale of the troops that outweigh the 
benefits of having a naval base
Even the second and final phase of the conflict then is not 
sure to turn out advantageous for the aggressor On the whole a 
counter-civilian-based defense strategy may be more likely to succeed 
and certain to be less costly than a full-fledged military invasion 
However whether that strategy can overpower civilian-based defense is 
difficult to predict As has been suggested earlier much will depend 
on the the nature of the societies that are involved m  the conflict 
Although a nonviolently defended society need not be a perfect 
democracy and a military aggressor need not be a horrible tyranny the 
odds that this is the case are definitely greater than the odds for 
the opposite being the case For nonviolence is as effective against 
internal usurpers as against external aggressors and will, therefore 
not be taken up as a defense method by unpopular regimes Moreover as 
the examples of Sweden and Austria indicate countries that adopt 
civilian~based defense tend to have a stable and democratic social 
system
Conclusion
To underscore the preliminary nature of this inquiry its 
results need to be related to avenues for future research Three
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issues in particular deserve special attention
(1) Nonviolent defense methods prove to be largely powerless 
against military border penetrations As has been mentioned m  
passing however, that weakness could be compensated by employing 
nonviolent retaliation tactics Presently, little is known about the 
nature and efficacy of such tactics Further research on them should 
be able to clarify their potential for responding to aggression as 
well as for initiating and executing it
(2) Currently, most countries are internally divided along 
ethnic, religious or social class lines Since internal rifts make a 
nation especially vulnerable to a counter-civilian-based defense 
strategy it seems to follow that only very few countries possess the 
luxury to adopt a civilian-based defense On the other hand the 
presence of an external threat is known to unite instead of to divide 
people and may counterbalance internal divisions Therefore 
additional mainly empirical research is required to find out the 
minimal conditions a society has to meet in order to be able to 
withstand a counter-civilian-based defense strategy
(3) Because of the danger of hostile border penetrations, it may 
seem desirable to complement civilian-based defense with some kind of 
military border defense More thought has to be given to the dangers 
and advantages of such a combined defense system For, at any rate if 
civilian-based defense becomes widespread, it will initially be as 
part of a predominantly military defense system The question to be 
answered is whether combined defense should be regarded as
? 17destabilizing or, on the contrary be welcomed as an ideal end s LsJtz f
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4 Historical cases of nonviolent struggle are amply documented 
m  Gene Sharp The Politics of Nonviolent Action The integration 
of nonviolent struggle tactics m  a national defense strategy is 
discussed m  Adam Roberts ed Civilian Resistance as a National 
Defense (Harrisburg PA Stackpole 1968), esp pp 215-308 
Herbert M Kritzer "Nonviolent National Defense Concepts and 
Implications," Peace Research Reviews 5 (1974), 5 (April), pp 1~ 
57, Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War without Weapons Non- 
Violence in National Defense (New York Schocken Books, 1975) 
Johan Galtung, M0n the Strategy of Nonmilitary Defense Some 
Proposals and Problems," m  Peace. War and Defence Essays m  
Peace Research Vol II (Copenhagen Christian Eljers, 1976) pp
378-426 and Gene Sharp Making Europe Unconquerable__The
Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense (Cambridge
MA Ballinger 1985)
5 A notable exception is that some authors have paid attention 
to the case of an aggressor who aims at territorial control over 
a sparsely populated area Towards the end of the paper more will 
be said about this case The main argument of this paper 
however assumes that the aggressor also wants to control human 
resources m  the attacked country
6 Within the confines of this paper a detailed argumentation m  
support of this framework is impossible Hence, it should not be 
conceived of as an attempt to prove the thesis that a civilian- 
based defense system can successfully withstand a full-scale 
military invasion and occupation Rather, its purpose is to 
accentuate the particularity of the danger of small-scale attacks 
for a country that is defended through nonviolent methods
7 Elaine Scarry goes as far as to define war as "the activity of 
reciprocal injuring where the goal is to out-injure the 
opponent " See her The Body in P a m  The Making and Unmaking of 
the World (N Y Oxford University Press, 1985), p 63
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8 The Oxford English Dictionary (Sec Ed , 1989) defines 
"violence" as "The exercise of physical force so as to inflict 
injury on or cause damage to persons or property action or 
conduct characterized by this treatment or usage tending to 
cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal 
freedom " Advocates of nonviolent action generally employ a 
somewhat narrower definition for they do allow causing damage to 
property on condition that there is no danger that people get 
hurt Hence "nonviolence" should primarily be understood as the 
absence of violence against persons
9 R Emerson From Empire to Nation (Cambridge MA Harvard 
University Press 1960) p 102 For more specific definitions of 
nationality and nationhood see Philip L White "What is a 
Nationality7" Canadian Review of Studies m  Nationalism 12 
(1985) , pp 1-23
10 This is made possible by creating and propagating distorted 
enemy images For more on enemy images see Sam Keen Faces of 
the Enemy Reflections of the Hostile Imagination (San'Francisco 
Harper & Row, 1986) and Brian McNair, Images of the Enemy 
Reporting the Cold War (London Routledge 1988)
11 It should be observed that these actions do not need a full- 
fledged national army to be carried out They could be executed 
also by guerilla movements or organized crime gangs that have 
their bases m  a country that supports or at least condones their 
behavior Indeed the weakness of civilian-based defense is I 
want to argue that, while it may be able to defeat military 
occupation forces it is not very efficient in fighting limited 
forms of violence such as terrorism organized crime guerilla 
activity, piracy and raiding
12 Boserup & Mack War Without Weapons pp 74-75 For a similar 
argument see Galtung, "On the Strategy of Nonmilitary Defense " 
p 390
13 Robert David Sack Human Territoriality Its Theory and 
History (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1986) p 32 On 
the role of boundaries for group formation see, e g Michael A 
Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications A Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London 
Routledge 1988) and Anthony P Cohen, The Symbolic Construction 
of Community (London Tavistock 1985)
14 Yi-Fu Tuan, "Geopiety A Theme m  Man's Attachment to Nature 
and to Place " pp 23-24 Geographies of the Mind Essays m  
Historical Geosophv (N Y Oxford University Press 1976) pp 11- 
39
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15 See e g Albert Hunter "Persistence of Local Sentiments m  
Mass Society " Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life Ed by David 
Street et al (San Francisco Jossey-Bass 1978) pp 133-162
16 For more about Heimat-sentiments and their relationship with 
love for the fatherland see Chapter 2 of Robert Michels' Per 
Patriotismus Prolegomena zu seiner soziologischen Analyse 
(München Duncker & Humblot, 1929)
17 The first thorough discussion of this question can be found 
in "Can Non-violence Be Combined with Military Means for National 
Defense7" Journal of Peace Research 25 (1988), pp 69-80
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